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PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY
Is a Prosecutor Who Gives Sworn, but False,
Statements to Obtain an Arrest Warrant Entitled
to Absolute Immunity from Suit?
by J. Gordon Hylton
The success or failure of civil rights
actions filed against government
officials under the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 (also known as the Ku Klux
Klan Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994)
("Section 1983"), often is deter-
mined by the availability of an
immunity defense. The Supreme
Court has held that Section 1983
implicitly recognizes two types of
immunity: absolute immunity
extended to legislators and judges
and qualified immunity that
applies to executive branch officials
such as the police. While absolute
immunity shields the government-
official defendant even in cases of
intentional misconduct, qualified
immunity (see Glossary) protects
the defendant only if his or her
actions are reasonable and do not
violate clearly established law.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635 (1987).
These distinctions prompt an
obvious question: Which type of
immunity ought to extend to prose-
cutors. This question, however, has
proven difficult to answer.
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The argument that prosecutors
should share the absolute immunity
of judicial officials is based on the
belief that the fear of being sued
would undermine a prosecutor's
performance of his or her duties.
While there is little dissent from
this belief, opponents of absolute
immunity point out that the modern
prosecutor functions in both a
judicial and investigatory capacity.
Critics say that to allow prosecutors
to operate behind a shield of
absolute immunity while involved in
the investigatory phase of the
criminal process would allow them
to engage freely in conduct that
would result in liability if undertak-
en by a nonprosecutorial law-
enforcement official.
The Supreme Court's first occasion
to address absolute prosecutorial
immunity came in Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
(Continued on Page 50)
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There the Court held that a state
prosecutor had absolute immunity
from a Section 1983 suit arising in
the context of initiating and pursu-
ing a criminal prosecution. The
Court reasoned that the common
law in 1871 when Section 1983 was
enacted contained a well-settled
rule of absolute prosecutorial
immunity and that "the same
considerations of public policy that
underlie the common law rule like-
wise countenance absolute immuni-
ty under Section 1983." 424 U.S. at
424. The Court, however, limited its
holding by noting that absolute
prosecutorial immunity did not
extend to all actions but only to
those "intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal
process." 424 U.S. at 430.
The Court since Imbler has had
several occasions to define the line
between a prosecutor's judicial func-
tions, which are absolutely immune,
and investigatory or administrative
functions, which receive only the
ordinary qualified immunity
enjoyed by executive branch offi-
cials. In Mallev v. Briggs, 475 U.S.
335 (1986), the Court refused to
extend the absolute immunity
afforded to prosecutors to a police
officer who allegedly submitted false
information in support of a criminal
complaint coupled with a request
for an arrest warrant. In Burns v.
Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991),
ABA PREVIEW 142 (Jan. 25, 1991),
the Court held that a prosecutor's
actions stemming from his partici-
pation in a probable cause hearing
were protected by absolute immuni-
ty, but his giving of advice to the
police on the propriety of hypnotiz-
ing a suspect and on the existence
of probable cause to arrest was not.
More recently in Buckley v.
Fitz.simnons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993),
ABA PREvIEW 203 (Feb. 5, 1993),
the Court declined to extend
absolute immunity to prosecutors
for statements made to the press
or for actions undertaken while
engaged in actual investigative work
prior to a suspect's arrest.
In deciding prosecutorial absolute-
immunity cases, the Court has used
a functional test to determine which
prosecutorial conduct is and is not
protected by absolute immunity. In
an oft-quoted phrase, the Court has
stated that it looks to "the nature of
the function performed, not the
identity of the actor who performed
it." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.
219, 229 (1988). Thus conduct
relating to the investigatory process
essentially, a police function - is
not protected by absolute immunity,
while actions relating to the tradi-
tional prosecutorial function, i.e.,
when the prosecutor functions as an
officer of the court or as the advo-
cate of the state, are protected.
Until this case, however, the Court
had not addressed specifically the
question of whether a prosecutor's
securing of an arrest warrant is a
judicial or an investigatory function
for purposes of the absolute-immu-
nity defense.
ISSUE
Is a state prosecutor entitled to
absolute immunity from a Section
1983 lawsuit arising from actions
taken to secure an arrest warrant in
conjunction with filing criminal
charges against a defendant?
FACTS
On November 30, 1992, the Seattle
Police Department referred a
completed investigation report
regarding a burglary to the prose-
cuting attorney of King County,
Washington. The report implicated
the respondent here, Rodney
Fletcher, in the theft of money and
computer equipment from a private
school in Seattle. The case was
referred to deputy prosecutor Lynne
Kalina, the petitioner, who deter-
mined that criminal charges should
be filed against Fletcher.
Criminal prosecutions in
Washington can be initiated either
by grand jury indictment or by the
filing of an information. In the latter
procedure, which is used in the
majority of felony prosecutions in
Washington, the prosecuting attor-
ney presents criminal charges
against a defendant directly to the
court. Consistent with office prac-
tice and State procedures, Kalina
filed charging documents against
Fletcher with the King County
Superior Court on December 14,
1992.
The charging documents included:
1) an information charging Fletcher
with second-degree burglary; 2) a
Certification for Determination of
Probable Cause in which Kalina
summarized the case against
Fletcher and attested that the police
report contained sufficient inforina-
tion to warrant formal charges (the
"warrant request"); and 3) a Motion
and Order Determining the
Existence of Probable Cause,
Directing Issuance of an Arrest
Warrant, and Fixing Bail. The trial
court found probable cause that
Fletcher committed the crime
charged and issued an arrest war-
rant for him that same day.
Fletcher was not arrested until
September 24. 1993. After examin-
ing the charging documents,
Fletcher's attorney complained that
Kalina's warrant request contained a
number of inaccurate statements.
A month later, the prosecuting
attorney reviewed the evidence and
then dropped all charges against
Fletcher.
Issue No. 1
Fletcher subsequently filed suit in
federal district court under Section
1983, charging that Kalina violated
his civil rights, specifically his right
to be free from unlawful arrest as
guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. In his complaint
Fletcher accused Kalina of seeking
an arrest warrant without probable
cause and attesting to facts
implicating him that she knew, or
should have known, to be false.
In particular Fletcher alleged that
Kalina knew that no eyewitnesses
linked him to the burglary, though
she said in the warrant request that
there were such eyewitnesses.
Fletcher also alleged that Kalina
knew that he was authorized to
enter the school, though she cited
the presence of his fingerprint at
the scene as linking him to the bur-
glary. Fletcher's lawsuit, however,
did not challenge the propriety of
filing the information itself, conduct
that he implicitly concedes is
protected by absolute immunity.
Kalina denied Fletcher's allegations
pertaining to false statements in
the warrant request. She also filed a
motion for summary judgment (see
Glossary), asserting that she was
entitled to absolute prosecutorial
immunity in this case.
The district court denied the
motion, and Kalina immediately
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The
appeals court affirmed, holding that
Kalina's actions in signing and filing
the warrant request were entitled to
only qualified immunity. 93 F.3d
653 (9th Cir. 1996).
The Ninth Circuit's decision is now
before the Supreme Court which
granted Kalina's petition for a writ of
certiorari. 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
CASE ANA1xSIS
The decision in this case turns on
the proper characterization of
Kalina's arrest-warrant request, a
request made under oath by way of
her supporting affidavit. If Kalina's
warrant request is viewed as part of
the judicial phase of the criminal
proceeding against Fletcher,
absolute immunity will attach; if it
is seen as part of the investigatory
process, a different result - quali-
fied immunity - is the likely
outcome. To decide which charac-
terization is appropriate, the Court
must decide whether to treat
Kalina's warrant request as an
action separate and apart from her
other actions taken on December
14, 1992, the day she filed criminal
charges against Fletcher.
In declining to accord absolute
immunity to Kalina's warrant
request, the Ninth Circuit focused
solely on the request and found the
logic of Mallev controlling. In reject-
ing Kalina's argument that filing
the warrant request simultaneously
with the information made her
actions those of an advocate, not an
investigator, the appeals court saw
no meaningful difference between a
false affidavit sworn by a police
officer in support of an arrest
warrant and false one sworn by a
prosecutor. While acknowledging
that it is standard practice in
Washington for the prosecutor to
prepare the warrant request at
issue, the Ninth Circuit noted that
Washington rules do not require
that the document be presented in
that form. Consequently, the
appeals court reasoned, if a police
officer or a complaining witness
attested to the warrant request, nei-
ther would be protected by absolute
immunity. According to the Ninth
Circuit, to allow Kalina to claim
such immunity for the same action
would be inconsistent with the
functional analysis that the
Supreme Court has applied in
prosecutorial-immunity cases.
Kalina argues that the Ninth
Circuit's focus on the warrant
request alone was improper and
misstated the prosecutor's role in
Washington's criminal justice sys-
tem. Since the warrant request in
this case was made in conjunction
with filing an information, she
insists that it was clearly part of the
prosecutorial, rather than investiga-
tive, process. Kalina maintains that
the prosecutor's filing of a warrant
request is no different than a prose-
cutor's appearance at a probable
cause hearing, conduct held to be
protected by absolute immunity in
Burns v. Reed. In both situations,
argues Kalina, the prosecutor is pro-
viding the court with a factual basis
for a probable cause determination
and is in no way attesting indepen-
dently to the accuracy of statements
presented.
If the Court is inclined to reverse
the Ninth Circuit's holding, it could
do so on broad or narrow grounds.
A few courts in the past have
found that a prosecutor's conduct in
securing an arrest warrant always
is subject to absolute immunity
regardless of the circumstances.
See, e.., Lerzwill v. Joslin, 712 F.2d
435 (1(th Cir. 1983); Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
More recent cases have followed
Imbler and have suggested that
when the prosector's participation
in the request for an arrest warrant
is active and occurs prior to bring-
ing formal charges, the conduct is
not protected by absolute immunity.
See, e.., Ireland . Tunis, 113 F.3d
1435 (6th Cir. 19)7); Kohl V.
Casson, 5 F.3d 1141 (Sth Cir. 1993).
(Conwtined on Ptac 52)
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While the Court could extend or
deny absolute immunity in all
situations involving prosecutor-
attested arrest warrants, the Court
instead likely will focus on the spe-
cific situation presented here - a
prosecutor executing an affidavit
providing probable cause to arrest
and filing the affidavit simultaneous-
ly with an information or request
for indictment. This is the focus
taken in the wake of the Court's
Imbler decision by all of the circuit
courts of appeals except the Ninth
Circuit in this case. Under this
approach, Kalina would prevail. See,
e.g., Joseph v. Patterson, 795 F.2d
549, 555 (6th Cir. 1986) ("decision
to file a criminal complaint and seek
issuance of an arrest warrant are
quasi-judicial duties involved in
initiating a prosecution which is
protected under Imbler"); Roberts v.
Kling, 104 F.3d 316, 320 (10th Cir.
1997) (absolute immunity appropri-
ate because "the act of obtaining an
arrest warrant in conjunction with
the filing of a criminal complaint is
functionally part of the initiation
of a criminal proceeding, and
therefore prosecutorial in nature").
Unless the Supreme Court fears that
extending absolute immunity to this
situation would create too great of
an opportunity for prosecutorial
abuse, which is one argument
advanced by Fletcher, it likely will
adopt the foregoing reasoning.
Indeed in Imbler and subsequent
cases, the Court has emphasized
that certain "actions preliminary to
the initiation of a prosecution and
actions apart from the courtroom"
are entitled to absolute immunity.
424 U.S. at 431, n. 33. As the Court
said in Buckley, "acts undertaken by
a prosecutor in preparing for the
initiation of judicial proceedings or
for trial, and which occur in the
course of his role as an advocate for
the state, are entitled to the protec-
tions of absolute immunity." 509
U.S. at 273. Since the filing of the
information by Kalina clearly is pro-
tected by absolute immunity and
since common sense suggests that
often it will be difficult to imple-
ment a prosecution without an
arrest, the challenged procedure in
this case would seem to fall within
the category of absolutely protected
conduct described by the Court in
its previous opinions.
The attention the Imbler Court
devoted to historical immunities of
prosecutors suggests that the argu-
ments in this case would have
homed in on the question of
whether or not prosecutors were
absolutely immune from prosecu-
tion for false arrest when Section
1983 became law in 1871. However
neither party addresses this issue,
and history did not appear to be a
factor in the Ninth Circuit's
decision.
The absence of a historical argu-
ment may be due in part to the fact
that Section 1983's historical record
is very sketchy on the issue of
prosecutorial immunity in the con-
text of arrest warrants. The first
reported case in anyway directly
related to this issue did not occur
until a quarter century after Section
1983 was adopted. Griffith v.
Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896).
At the very least it can be argued
that the absolute immunity from
suits for defamation and false
prosecution enjoyed by prosecutors
under the common law extended to
false arrest as well, as one commen-
tator of the day noted. M.L. Newell,
A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF FALSE
IMPRISONMENT AND THE ABUSE OF
LEGAL PROCESS (1892).
SIGNIFICANCE
This case has generated a great deal
of interest on the part of prosecu-
tors and other government lawyers.
Friend-of-the-court briefs on
behalf of Kalina have been filed by
the United States Department of
Justice and the attorneys general of
28 individual states, among others.
Kalina and her supporters are con-
cerned that if the Supreme Court
limits the immunity of prosecutors
in cases like this one, prosecutorial
efforts will be hampered, particular-
ly in close cases. Given that
approximately one quarter of all
felony indictments and informations
in the United States ultimately are
dismissed, this may not be an idle
concern. Of course the problem of
prosecutorial liability following a
decision against absolute immunity
in the arrest context could be
addressed in a number of ways, e.g.,
using police officers or complaining
witnesses to sign probable cause
affidavits, scheduling probable cause
hearings, or placing greater reliance
on grand jury indictment. But these
and other approaches are expensive,
time-consuming, and would tax the
resources of already overburdened
criminal justice systems.
The Court's decision has the
potential to resolve a broad range of
questions pertaining to the limits of
prosecutorial immunity, particularly
should the Court elaborate on, or
decide to restate, the standards
developed in Imbler, Burns v. Reed,
and Buckley.
Issue No. 1
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